Introduction
The past two decades have seen a remarkable embrace of economics in the sphere of environmental policy. Emissions trading (also known as cap and trade), first proposed by Dales (1968) but long restricted to academic wish lists, is now the presumptive method for new regulation of pollution in the United States. The landmark U.S. Acid Rain Program, Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, instituted a system of tradable emissions permits to cut sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) emissions from electric power plants. Dubbed "a grand policy experiment" by Stavins (1997) , this program has cut emissions by 40 percent at a fraction of the predicted cost, with overwhelming benefits to human health and ecosystems (NAPAP 2005) . The SO 2 program inspired the use of emissions trading for nitrous oxides (NO x ) in the northeastern United States, and paved the way for what is now the world's largest emissions market, the European Union's Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) for carbon dioxide (CO 2 ). In the United States, cap and trade has been proposed for climate policies at the state and regional levels, and as the U.S. Congress contemplates serious action on climate change, cap and trade has been the centerpiece of every viable legislative proposal.
One might have expected economists to be celebrating the ascendancy of their ideas. Instead, an odd thing has happened: A growing chorus of economists is vocally opposing cap and trade proposals for controlling greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and calling for a carbon tax instead. Economists were once frustrated that their prescriptions were not followed by legislators-to use Hahn's (1989) memorable analogy, they worried that the patient was not following the doctor's orders. But now that the patient is dutifully taking her medicine, recovering beautifully, and asking for a refill, the doctor wants to abandon the treatment and try an alternative therapy.
The praise for a price-based approach, however, has often overlooked strong arguments in favor of tradable permits. This article presents the case for using a cap and trade program to control U.S. GHG emissions. In companion articles in this symposium, the case for a carbon tax is presented by Metcalf (2008) , while Murray, Newell, and Pizer (2008) propose an allowance reserve for cap and trade.
The basic structure of cap and trade is simple. Total allowable emissions are limited (the "cap"), and an equivalent number of allowances are created, which may be bought or sold on a market (the "trade"). Each facility's emissions are monitored and recorded; at the end of a compliance period, each facility must hand over an equivalent number of allowances to the government. A firm seeking to minimize its cost of complying with the program will abate pollution until its marginal cost equals the market price of an allowance. As a result, in theory, cap and trade programs are cost-effective: they achieve the required amount of emissions reduction at the lowest possible total abatement cost.
1 In addition, a cap and trade program for GHGs would allow firms to bank allowances (i.e., use them after the year in which they were allocated) or even borrow them from future periods. Such intertemporal flexibility will equate the marginal costs of abatement across time. As will become clear below, this feature is crucial, since the damages from climate change are driven by cumulative emissions of GHGs over long periods of time.
Allowances may be freely distributed, sold at auction, or some combination of the two. Regardless of how they are initially allocated, under standard assumptions, trading will give rise to an equilibrium price equal to the emissions tax that would achieve the same expected abatement (Montgomery 1972) ; indeed, in the absence of significant transactions costs, the equilibrium allocation of abatement will be identical under both cap and trade and a carbon tax (Coase 1960; Stavins 1995) .
A cap and trade system and a carbon tax are also similar in terms of administrative costs. While emissions trading requires creating and maintaining a market, the associated administrative costs are likely to be small: overseeing allowance transfers accounts for less than 5 percent of the costs of administering the U.S. SO 2 trading program (LECG 2003 , citing data from the Environmental Protection Agency). In contrast, emissions monitoring alone accounts for roughly two-thirds of administrative costs-costs that would be the same under a tax. Regardless of whether emissions are taxed or capped, they must be measured. If emissions are difficult or costly to measure, the "point of regulation" can be established upstream for either a tax or a cap and trade program; for example, emissions from cars and trucks can be measured at the refinery gate (in the carbon content of motor fuels) rather than at the tailpipe. Moreover, neither a carbon tax nor cap and trade requires accurate data on historical emissions. GHG allowances could be allocated on the basis of proxies for which data already exist-such as the heat input of fuels (as in the SO 2 program) or the manufacturing output; if allowances are auctioned, there is no need for estimating a historical baseline at all.
My discussion of the merits of a cap and trade program is organized around two basic distinctions between emissions taxes and tradable permit systems: how the value of emissions is allocated, and whether the policy sets the price or the quantity of emissions. In the next section, I discuss the first distinction. Under a tax, as commonly proposed, the government captures the value of emissions in the form of tax revenue. In contrast, under most cap and trade systems, the government gives away a significant fraction of the value to emitters in the form of free allowances. While raising revenue can reduce deadweight losses (if used to cut marginal taxes), free allocation offers important political advantages, in particular providing legislators with flexibility that is crucial for balancing distribution and efficiency.
The third and fourth sections discuss the merits of cap and trade in the context of the second and more fundamental distinction: that a carbon tax sets the price of emissions, while a tradable emissions permit system sets the quantity. A number of implications follow. First, price and quantity instruments frame political debates very differently, and create different incentives for regulated firms concerning the desired scope of the program. Second, cap and trade systems are more easily harmonized across countries without explicit coordinationenhancing the cost-effectiveness, scope, and equity of an international climate regime. Third, in contrast to a tax, the price of tradable permits can fluctuate in the short run; although this raises concerns about price volatility, I argue that such fears have been overstated.
The fourth and the most significant implication of the prices-versus-quantities distinction concerns efficiency when marginal abatement costs are uncertain. The conventional wisdom among economists is that such uncertainty favors a price instrument. In the fourth section, I argue that this view ignores the possibility of banking and borrowing allowances, and overlooks the growing scientific evidence that climate change will be nonlinear and characterized by "tipping points." I then present a simple thought experiment to show how, under plausible assumptions, a prices-versus-quantities argument might favor a cap and trade system. The last section presents a summary and some conclusions.
Allocating the Value of Emissions
The first basic distinction between emissions taxes and tradable permits concerns how the total value of emissions (i.e., the quantity of pollution emitted under the policy times the price) is allocated between the government and the regulated industry. Proposals for a carbon tax typically envision levying the tax on every ton of emissions, thus capturing the entire value of emissions for the government. Under a tradable permits system, on the other hand, a substantial fraction of the emissions value would likely be given to the regulated industries, in the form of free allowances.
Whether the value of emissions is captured by the government or allocated to polluters has implications for both economic efficiency and political feasibility. These implications, and what they mean for the merits of tradable permits relative to a carbon tax, are discussed below.
Economic Efficiency
Economic efficiency is plainly enhanced if the government captures the value of emissions and uses the revenue to reduce preexisting distortionary taxes on labor and capital (Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw 1997; Parry, Williams, and Goulder 1999) . This so-called "double dividend" does not necessarily provide a free lunch: the estimated revenue would only partially offset the general equilibrium costs of climate policy. Nonetheless, the efficiency gains (relative to not capturing the revenue and recycling it through reductions in marginal tax rates) would be substantial. The revenues potentially available from a carbon tax or allowance auction could reach into hundreds of billions of dollars a year-on the order of 10 percent of the federal government's current tax receipts.
The prospect of raising and recycling revenue is typically cited as grounds for preferring a carbon tax. However, tradable permits can perform equally well on this score: An allowance auction will raise the same expected revenue as taxing the same quantity of emissions. Moreover, merely raising revenue is not the same as spending it wisely. Whether they tax carbon or auction allowances, legislators are likely to spend much or all of the revenue on priorities other than reducing marginal tax rates.
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Even if a carbon tax is more likely to raise (and hence recycle) revenue in practice, that advantage is moot unless legislation becomes a reality. I turn next to the political implications of free allocation.
Political Feasibility
Allocating the value of emissions to polluters (for example, by giving away allowances) has important political advantages that not only make passage of legislation more likely, but may also improve the design of the legislation and help ensure that it will last.
Likelihood of Passage
Both legislators and interest groups are likely to favor tradable permit systems with free allocation over taxes (Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins 1998) . Among other advantages, this approach affords legislators greater control over distributional outcomes, offers the certainty of emissions reductions, and reduces the compliance costs borne by regulated industries. Taxes, on the other hand, are notoriously unpopular in the United States. The historical record suggests that a carbon tax would be unlikely to pass.
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Scope of the Program
A cap and trade system and a carbon tax provide different opportunities for firms and industries to seek special treatment. A carbon tax encourages emitters to seek exemptionscreating pressure to shrink the program, constraining its scope, and thus reducing costeffectiveness by limiting gains from trade (Stavins 2008) . Under a cap and trade system, meanwhile, firms can lobby for favorable allowance allocations. Although emitters could also seek to be left out of a cap and trade system altogether, the prospect of free allowances lessens that incentive. Indeed, since allowances can be sold, a firm with low abatement costs that receives a surplus of allowances could be better off under a cap and trade program than under the status quo. This is especially true, given that it is not just a firm's absolute returns that matter, but also its relative performance within an industry.
Rent Seeking
Some commentators argue that freely allocating permits invites rent seeking, as regulated firms or other interest groups compete for allowances (Nordhaus 2007; Metcalf 2007) . Like any rent-seeking behavior, such activity is a drain on the economy, since it diverts resources from productive uses.
However, rent-seeking behavior may well be less problematic under a cap and trade program than under a carbon tax. An emissions cap puts a natural limit on free allocation: no more than 100 percent of the allowances can be given away. This turns the distributional battle over allowance allocation into a zero-sum game, and effectively decouples it from the choice of the policy objective. (Indeed, the major emitters that would be regulated by a U.S. cap and trade policy have indicated that they would support ambitious emissions targets if they were granted enough free allowances.) Under a tax, on the other hand, there is no natural limit on the extent of exemptions that may be granted.
Political Sustainability
Free allocation can also help to sustain political support for a cap and trade policy, by creating a constituency within the regulated industry with a vested interest in seeing the policy continue. A firm that expects to be a net seller of permits (having invested, say, in advanced pollution control equipment) will have a strong economic interest in high permit prices-and thus in maintaining or even strengthening a cap and trade program. Cap and trade also creates a strong economic incentive for such firms to support accurate reporting of emissions and rigorous enforcement of compliance, since cheating by other firms will lessen demand for allowances and therefore devalue them (Ellerman 2006) . This incentive will be in addition to the interest that firms have (under any form of regulation) in promoting compliance by their rivals in order to preclude unfair advantages in output markets.
Of course, these forms of support will not be universal: they will be concentrated among firms that expect to sell allowances rather than buy them. In contrast, all emitters will be aligned in opposition to a carbon tax-they will all be "net buyers," after all-and will represent an ever-present lobby to reduce it. The recent debate over gasoline taxes is instructive here: Despite the fact that the United States enjoys the lowest gasoline tax among industrialized countries (International Energy Agency 2007, pp. 308-310) , leading members of both major U.S. political parties have recently called for suspending the gas tax because of high prices at the pump.
Admittedly, there are also political advantages of spending revenue. Doling out dollars rather than allowances makes it easier to compensate interest groups other than emitters. A "climate dividend" or tax rebate to households could secure long-run public support much as in the case of Social Security. Free allocation does not have a monopoly on political advantage. But it is likely to have strong appeal among legislators and powerful interest groups, in a way that will boost the program's chances of passage and success.
The Value of Flexibility
The ultimate advantage of a cap and trade system is its flexibility: it does not require legislators to allocate the value of emissions for free, but it does offer them a straightforward means of doing so. After all, an allowance auction can raise revenue just as well as a tax can. Although nearly all of the cap and trade programs implemented to date-including the U.S. SO 2 market, the RECLAIM and NO x Budget Programs, and the EU ETS-have granted the vast majority of emissions allowances to emitters, political support for auctions may be gaining momentum. For example, nearly all allowances are being auctioned under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative underway in the northeastern United States; the EU ETS plans to auction all allowances by 2020; major legislation introduced in Congress has proposed auctioning a significant share of allowances; and incoming President Barack Obama has called for full auctioning. Ultimately, the most likely outcome for a U.S. cap and trade program is that an increasing share of allowances will be auctioned over time, with the remainder being distributed for free.
Market-based environmental policies involve a fundamental distributional issue: How should we divide up the "pie" created by placing a price on emissions? Should we allocate it to polluters, to other interests, or to the economy as a whole? A cap and trade system allows a ready means of calibrating the trade-off between distribution and efficiency. In a nutshell, it offers the "best of both worlds." This political flexibility is likely to make cap and trade more effective than a carbon tax in accommodating political realities while still accomplishing the ultimate goal of controlling GHG emissions.
Setting Prices Versus Setting Quantities
An even more fundamental difference between cap and trade and a carbon tax is the distinction between setting a price and controlling quantity. Under a cap and trade program, the total quantity of cumulative emissions is fixed and the price of emissions arises indirectly through the allowance market. 4 In contrast, a carbon tax determines the price directly, but leaves the quantity of emissions up to regulated firms.
If the marginal costs and benefits of abatement were static and known with certainty, and if policy were made by beneficent economists, the distinction between prices and quantities would be unimportant. In this case, either a price or a quantity instrument could achieve the efficient level of emissions, which equates marginal cost and marginal benefit.
Reality is more complicated. Actual emissions under a tax will depend on economic growth, the cost of abatement technology, policies enacted elsewhere (which set terms of trade and relative prices), and so on-all factors that cannot be known with certainty ahead of time. As a result, a tax may not achieve-indeed, is unlikely to achieve-any particular level of cumulative emissions specified in advance. Similarly, under a cap and trade system, the allowance price will be driven by factors such as the development of abatement technology, the prices of fossil fuels, and the demand for electric power. Over short periods, the allowance price will rise and fall depending on market conditions and economic shocks. The long-run price level will depend on underlying costs of abatement, and will not be known in advance.
Some economists have proposed "hybrid" instruments that combine elements of both prices and quantities. A prominent example is the so-called "safety valve," which would limit the cost uncertainty in a tradable permits program by imposing a price ceiling-that is, a price at which the government would sell an unlimited quantity of allowances. This idea, first proposed by Roberts and Spence (1976) , has been revived for climate policy (e.g., Pizer 2002; see Jacoby and Ellerman [2004] for a critique, and Murray, Newell, and Pizer [2008, this symposium] for an alternative).
Such a hybrid instrument might seem to offer the best of both worlds: greater control over quantity than a tax, and greater control over price than a cap and trade program. But looks can be deceptive. Although in theory the safety valve could be set high enough so that it would rarely be triggered, in practice the opposite has been true. For example, the price ceiling in legislation proposed by Senators Bingaman and Specter would have started at $12 per ton of CO 2 -equivalent and risen at 5 percent per annum in real terms. According to an analysis of the bill by the Environmental Protection Agency, the price ceiling would have been triggered throughout the duration of the program (USEPA 2008a). In other words, the "cap and trade with safety valve" was less a cap and trade program than a thinly disguised carbon tax-and a rather low one at that. More generally, the advantages and disadvantages of such hybrid instruments relative to a cap and trade program are essentially the same as those of a tax, differing in degree rather than in kind. Therefore, for the purposes of this article, I shall not consider them separately.
It is worth noting that the goals of climate policy are commonly defined in terms of quantity targets. For example, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, to which the United States is a party, declares its objective to be "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system." In contrast, few people (other than economists) consider the primary objective for climate policy to be setting a particular price. Moreover, we simply lack enough information on the marginal damages from GHG to set a tax, at least with any degree of confidence. A recent survey by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) found that estimates of marginal damages vary by a factor of 30, from $3 to $95 per metric ton of CO 2 , and that many of those estimates ignore nonmarket damages and catastrophic impacts (Yohe et al. 2007) .
Of course, the fact that the objective of climate policy is commonly defined in terms of quantity targets does not mean that it ought to be so; and if the marginal damages from emissions are uncertain, so too is the precise level of cumulative emissions needed to "prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference." At a deeper level, the price-versusquantity debate focuses on four issues: political implications, international harmonization, short-run volatility, and long-run efficiency. These issues, and their implications for the relative merits of price and quantity instruments, are the focus of the remainder of this section.
Political Implications
While the political importance of allocation is widely recognized, the political implications of the prices-versus-quantities distinction are often overlooked. Nonetheless, that distinction plays an important role in determining how policy objectives are framed and how broadly the program is designed.
Framing of Policy Objectives
The prices-versus-quantity distinction leads to very different debates about policy objectives. A proposal to tax GHG emissions focuses the debate on the size of the tax and the potential costs to the economy. In contrast, a proposal to cap emissions frames the discussion in terms of emissions targets and the consequences of climate change. Thus, the choice of instruments is likely to result in very different outcomes, with cap and trade likely to support more ambitious emissions reduction goals and a tax being tantamount to proposing a less stringent policy.
Scope of the Program
From an economic perspective, a cap or tax on carbon should cover as much of the economy as possible-not just in terms of the volume of emissions or the number of participants, but especially in terms of the variation in abatement opportunities. The broader the program, the greater are the gains from trade, and the lower are the total costs of meeting a given target.
A cap and trade system helps create support for a broad-based program because the price of allowances-and thus the marginal cost of abatement for firms-depends on the scope of the policy. Thus firms in an industry or a sector covered by a cap and trade program have an incentive to lobby for additional sectors and industries to be brought in, since their inclusion can create gains from trade and lessen the burden on the covered sectors. A tax creates no such incentive.
This incentive to broaden the program's scope is particularly relevant for "offset" provisions, under which tradable credits are awarded to entities that reduce emissions outside of the cap (e.g., landowners who sequester carbon in forests). By expanding the scope of abatement opportunities, a well-designed offset program lowers the overall cost of meeting emissions targets and enhances efficiency.
5 At the same time, a cap and trade program creates a natural constituency that supports offsets: polluting firms that expect to be net buyers of allowances, who will benefit from lower allowance prices. A carbon tax is less well suited to an offset program, since transactions costs are likely to be very high unless the offset tax credits are transferable. More importantly from a political economy perspective, offset credits would not lower the carbon tax, and hence would not attract the same political support as under a cap and trade system.
International Harmonization
Averting dangerous climate change will require deep cuts in GHG emissions by the world's advanced economies as well as meaningful reductions from middle-income and developing countries. Cap and trade furthers that goal by promoting cost-effective reductions, broad participation, and distributional equity. The size of the U.S. economy, and the magnitude of U.S. GHG emissions, imply that the policy chosen in the United States will play a central role in shaping the international policy framework.
Cost-effectiveness
In the international context, cap and trade has a key advantage over a carbon tax: it allows domestic policies to be aligned without explicit coordination on policy targets (i.e., emissions caps) among countries. This feature is crucial, because reducing global emissions at the lowest possible cost requires equating marginal abatement costs across countries. Given the wide variation in abatement opportunities between industrialized and developing countries, the potential gains from trade are enormous (Weyant and Hill 1999) .
A system of linked national cap and trade programs offers a promising way to achieve costeffective reductions (Stavins 2007) . Under such a system, individual countries or regions (such as the EU and the United States) would establish domestic allowance markets, and then let regulated firms purchase allowances from other systems for compliance with their own. In the absence of significant transactions costs (a reasonable assumption in a globalized world), such linkage would automatically equalize prices and hence marginal costs.
Cost-effectiveness could also be achieved through a harmonized carbon tax (Cooper 1998) . But a harmonized tax requires that participating countries agree explicitly upon a common tax rate. This would require much more coordination than simply allowing trading between two allowance markets. It seems unlikely that China and the United States, for example, could agree on a common carbon tax rate.
Linking cap and trade programs requires only that countries open up their markets to international trade in GHG allowances. Of course, some implicit coordination among countries would be required, or at least a willingness by each to cede some control over its own market. For example, certain policy measures, such as a "safety valve," are incompatible with linkage. Linkage also amplifies the importance of accurate monitoring and verification (Jaffe and Stavins 2007) .
International Participation
A cap and trade system can also promote broad international participation, since the lure of carbon markets in the developed world can provide a powerful incentive for developing and middle-income countries to commit to reduce their own emissions. These countries would almost surely be net sellers in a global carbon market-both because they have ample low-cost abatement opportunities, and because they are likely to receive more generous emissions targets than industrialized nations under an international agreement. As a result, emitters in the developing world could expect to earn substantial inframarginal profits from abating emissions and selling allowances.
6 Meanwhile, because advanced economies like the EU and the United States can set the terms of access to their own markets, they would have considerable leverage to persuade those other countries to take on binding emissions targets. An emissions tax provides neither such an incentive nor such leverage.
Distributional Equity
The likelihood of such international allowance transfers also makes cap and trade attractive on the grounds of distributional equity. The lowest-cost sources of abatement are located disproportionately in the developing world. This creates a mismatch between the opportunity to reduce emissions and the ability to pay for it. Hence it is not only efficient, but also equitable for richer nations to transfer money to developing countries to help fund abatement.
7 As with cost-effectiveness, emissions trading among countries would achieve this redistribution automatically, with no need for an explicit agreement that would be required under a system of harmonized carbon taxes.
Short-Run Price Volatility
A common concern about cap and trade programs is that they allow the price of emissions to fluctuate. Short-run price volatility could discourage the deployment of new capitalintensive abatement technologies, by giving rise to an option value from delaying irreversible investments (Chao and Wilson 1993) . A problem with this argument, however, is that the primary driver of investment is the price level itself, not its volatility. As discussed above, a cap and trade program is likely to be more stringent than a tax; hence the marginal price on emissions (and the incentive to invest) is likely to be greater.
Moreover, what matters most for investment decisions is volatility not in the emissions price per se, but in the return on capital. Volatility in investment returns is not unique to cap and trade: it will also arise under a carbon tax. This is because the return from investing in abatement depends not only on the price of emissions, but also on the marginal costs of alternative abatement techniques. Consider an electric utility deciding whether to install carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology. The return from the initial capital cost of CCS will depend on the expected variable costs of capturing and storing carbon, relative to reducing emissions by fuel-switching or demand-side management. Uncertainty in variable costs will translate into uncertain investment returns under either a cap and trade program or a carbon tax. Hence an option value arises in both cases, implying that price volatility by itself is unlikely to be a determining factor in the choice of policy instrument (Xepapadeas 1999; Zhao 2003; Baldursson and van der Fehr 2004) .
A second concern is that price volatility will have "major disruptive effects" on markets (Nordhaus 2007) . This concern, however, seems overstated. While existing emissions markets have exhibited volatility, a close look suggests that they may be a poor predictor of a future carbon market. The most dramatic example of price volatility has been in the RECLAIM market for NO x emissions in southern California, where permit prices rose so high and so fast that the program was temporarily suspended. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that volatility in the RECLAIM market was driven in part by the exercise of market power in the recently deregulated electricity industry (Kolstad and Wolak 2003) . This suggests that the RECLAIM market may have little relevance for a carbon market, which will be much larger and hence less subject to market manipulation.
Price movements in other markets can also be explained by specific circumstances. Price volatility in the EU ETS in 2006-2007, during the program's pilot phase, arose from an oversupply of allowances (a product of letting member countries determine their own allocations) along with the failure to allow banking; these problems have since been addressed. In the case of the SO 2 market, prices rose rapidly and then plummeted in the spring of 2005, as the EPA issued its Clean Air Interstate Rule, tightening regulatory limits on emissions. Far from representing irrational volatility, these price movements reflected the market's anticipation of more stringent emissions targets. Indeed Murray, Newell, and Pizer (2008, this symposium) argue that the ability of cap and trade markets to anticipate changes in regulation represents an important advantage of a quantity-based approach. Prior to the episode in 2005, SO 2 prices were much less volatile. Indeed, for the first phase of the program, annualized volatility was 25 percent, and remained around 20-30 percent through the end of 2004-much lower than the 80 percent computed by Nordhaus (2007) , and on a par with the S&P 500 rather than oil prices.
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Of course, some price volatility will surely arise in a U.S. carbon market, even after the program matures. But price volatility is a feature of many markets, including commodities markets (especially oil and natural gas). As in those other markets, an array of financial instruments-options, derivatives, swaps, and so on-will be available to help firms hedge volatility risk.
9
Certain design features of a cap and trade program can also help dampen the effects of price volatility. A variety of policies have been suggested that would limit short-run price volatility while protecting the integrity of the long-run cap on emissions.
10 Banking and borrowing could play a major role here, along with a range of other possibilities (Newell, Pizer, and Zhang 2005) . In this symposium, Murray, Newell, and Pizer (2008) propose an "allowance reserve," which would create a standing pool of allowances (taken from under the overall cap) that could be released in response to short-term cost shocks. Alternatively, Congress could create and distribute a limited number of tradable call and put options (analogous to stock options in financial markets) that firms could use to buy an allowance at a specified high price or sell an allowance at a low price. If designed carefully, this "Flex Options" approach could address volatility concerns while providing policy-makers with reasonable certainty about cumulative emissions in the long run. (2004), multiplied by 1/2 to convert six-month volatilities to annual ones. 9 The recent crisis in financial markets casts doubt on the ability of firms to accurately price novel and complex derivatives, and underscores the importance of transparency and government oversight; but it does not alter the basic point that an array of much simpler and more conventional hedges could be used to protect firms against price volatility in carbon markets. 10 While a "safety valve" would limit price volatility, in practice (as discussed at the start of this section) it would do so by transforming a cap and trade system into a tax-a cure that might be worse than the disease. 11 Credit is due to Jon Anda for bringing this idea to my attention.
Long-Run Cost Uncertainty
A crucial feature of climate change is uncertainty about the marginal cost of abatementespecially for technologies yet to be deployed (e.g., large-scale carbon capture and sequestration), yet to be developed (e.g., genetically manipulated yeast-generating jet fuel), or yet to be dreamed up. As is well known, when marginal costs are uncertain, the relative efficiency of a price instrument versus a quantity instrument depends on the relative slopes of the marginal benefit and marginal cost functions (Weitzman 1974) . In particular, a cap will be preferable when marginal benefits are steep relative to marginal costs-as when the damages from pollution exhibit a threshold. On the other hand, the flatter the marginal benefits, the more confident is the regulator about the true efficient price, and the stronger the preference (on efficiency grounds) for a tax.
The prevailing view among economists is that the marginal benefits of reducing GHG emissions are likely to be flat, since the damages from climate change are driven by the accumulated stock of pollution (e.g., Nordhaus 2007) . This view suggests that a carbon tax is preferred on efficiency grounds. This intuition has been supported by formal analyses that adapt Weitzman's original formulation to the case of stock pollutants (and to climate policy in particular) and find a strong preference for a price instrument (Hoel and Karp 2001, 2002; Newell and Pizer 2003) .
A Reassessment of the Prevailing View
In this section, I challenge the prevailing view just described. I also show how, under plausible assumptions, a Weitzman-style argument might support cap and trade instead. This thought experiment is not meant to be definitive; it is simply intended to illustrate the need to reassess the current conventional wisdom.
Problems with the Prevailing View
There are two fundamental problems with the prevailing view. First, it ignores banking and borrowing of allowances. The quantity instrument modeled by Newell and Pizer (2003) and Hoel and Karp (2001, 2002 ) is a series of annual quotas that fix allowable emissions in every year. 12 In contrast, as noted above, the cap and trade programs proposed in Congress would allow entities to both bank and borrow allowances (with some restrictions). Over the entire course of the policy, cumulative emissions would be fixed by the caps, ensuring that emissions targets will be met. However, in any given year, emissions would depend on the current allowance price, which we would expect to rise at something like the market interest rate. The resulting intertemporal flexibility could be crucial in smoothing out the effects of temporary cost shocks.
Second, the conventional wisdom assumes that the effects of climate change increase smoothly and steadily as a function of atmospheric concentrations of GHGs. Nordhaus (2008) assumes a quadratic function for damages as a function of temperature changes, partly for computational tractability. When expressed as a function of atmospheric concentrations, Nordhaus's damage function essentially becomes linear-suggesting a slope of marginal benefits near zero.
13 Both Newell and Pizer and Hoel and Karp ultimately rely on earlier estimates by Nordhaus in specifying damage functions; hence it is not surprising that these authors also find a preference for price instruments.
In fact, there is growing scientific evidence that climatic responses to temperature increases are highly nonlinear and characterized by abrupt changes (Lockwood 2001; Natural Research Council 2002; Rial et al. 2004) . Recent research identifies a range of possible "tipping points"-levels of warming that would trigger relatively rapid and irreversible changes in major components of the Earth's system. Examples include the loss of Arctic summer sea ice, the melting of the Greenland and West Antarctic Ice Sheets, the weakening of the North Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation, and the disappearance of the Amazon rainforest (Lenton et al. 2008) . Threshold effects have also been identified with respect to vulnerable ecosystems: coral reefs, for example, are threatened by bleaching events (triggered by rising temperatures) and ocean acidification (due to increased dissolved CO 2 concentrations).
14 Hence the damages from climate change are likely to increase dramatically at a series of thresholds; these tipping points are clustered between 2
• C and 5
• C above preindustrial temperatures.
To be sure, there is a fair amount of uncertainty over precisely where these thresholds might be. But such uncertainty does not affect the relative efficiency of prices versus quantities. Rather, what matters are the relative slopes in the neighborhood of the efficient point. Forecasts show that the mean global temperature is likely to rise 3-5
• C above preindustrial levels by the end of this century if we fail to curb GHG emissions (IPCC 2007, Figure 3 .2, p. 46). Even with ambitious policies, it will be difficult to limit the temperature increase to less than 2 degrees. Hence the relevant range of temperatures for policy is also roughly 2-5 degrees above preindustrial levels-coinciding with the likely damage thresholds presented above. Rather than alleviating concern about irreversible tipping points, the pervasive uncertainty about climate change compounds it. We cannot rule out the possibility that we are headed for truly catastrophic consequences: Weitzman (2008) , for example, estimates that there is a 5 percent chance that business-as-usual emissions will lead to a warming of more than 10
• C and a 1 percent chance of exceeding 20
• C. He goes on to show that the deep structural uncertainty translates into long and thick tails in the estimated probability distributions over climate damages, which dominate any analysis of optimal policy. What Weitzman calls his "generalized precautionary principle" dovetails with the more general argument that climate policy is best viewed in terms of risk management rather than consumption smoothing (Manne and Richels 1995; Yohe et al. 2003) . Even if these arguments do not (yet) provide a theoretical argument for cap and trade over a carbon tax, they lend urgency to the practical arguments that I have made in this article: namely, that a cap and trade program is a more 13 The conclusion that Nordhaus's damage function is essentially linear in concentrations-at least over the relevant range-is based on the estimates of long-run concentrations and present-value total damages presented in tables 5-7 and 5-8 in Nordhaus (2008) . 14 These tipping points are well summarized in a series of chapters in the contribution of Working Group II to the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report (Fischlin et al. 2007; Nicholls et al. 2007; Schneider et al. 2007 ).
promising approach, on both political and economic grounds, to achieve the near-term emissions reductions needed to hedge the risk of catastrophe.
A Simple Thought Experiment
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the existing economics literature tells us little about the relative efficiency of an emissions tax versus a long-term cap and trade program. There is an urgent need to fill these gaps in the literature, but such a research task is well beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, we can get a glimpse of the issues at stake by considering a simple thought experiment. As a starting point, consider defining the marginal costs and benefits of climate policy in terms of cumulative emissions reductions through the end of the century (i.e., over the period 2010-2100). It is natural to think about marginal benefits in terms of cumulative abatement, since damages depend on the concentration of GHGs. But a cumulative approach is also a reasonable way-although a more unusual one-to think about marginal costs. Indeed, especially given the importance of capital investment to the overall costs of abating GHGs, what matters for policy is the long-run marginal abatement cost curve (MACC) rather than the short-run MACC for a single year. The long-run MACC measures, at each level of cumulative abatement, the incremental cost of achieving one more unit of abatement over the duration of a policy. A good proxy for it can be derived from computable general equilibrium (CGE) models of prospective U.S. climate policy. These models generally assume cost-minimizing intertemporal allocation of abatement, so that predicted allowance prices are constant in present-value terms over the model's time horizon. Hence the forecasted allowance price in any given year, for a particular hypothetical climate policy, represents the estimated aggregate marginal cost (expressed in that year's current value) associated with the cumulative abatement achieved by that policy over its duration. Note that this long-run MACC implicitly incorporates allowance banking and borrowing through the assumption of dynamic cost-effectiveness.
The appendix presents the assumptions and calculations used to derive back-of-theenvelope estimates of the slopes of marginal cost and benefit functions defined in terms of cumulative emissions. A summary of the results is given here.
Drawing on forecasts by a widely used CGE climate model (the ADAGE model maintained by Research Triangle Institute), I estimate the slope of marginal cost in the United States (expressed in present-value terms and in 2005 dollars) to be 8.0 × 10 7 $/GTCO 2 e 2 . This estimate implies that each incremental gigaton of abatement over the period 2010-2100 raises the present value of marginal cost by roughly $80 million per gigaton. 15 Note that this estimate is based only on the marginal abatement costs in the United States. A global marginal cost curve would be more appropriate-and would necessarily be much flatter.
Next, in the same back-of-the-envelope spirit, I estimate marginal benefits. I use Nordhaus's (2008) damage function as a starting point, but assume that catastrophic damages are zero under a threshold of 3
• C. 16 Since Nordhaus expresses damages as a function of temperature, I use results from a commonly used climate model to relate temperature changes to cumulative emissions, again taking the period 2010-2100 as the relevant time horizon. A few calculations yield an estimated slope for the marginal damages function (equivalently, the absolute value of the slope of the marginal benefit function) in the range of 2.4 to 5.9 × 10 8 $/GTCO 2 e 2 (in present value). (The lower and upper values of the range correspond to temperature targets of 2
• C and 4
• C above preindustrial levels, respectively.) The slope of the marginal benefit function is thus three to seven times greater than the slope of the marginal cost function, suggesting a preference for a quantity instrument. Note that the marginal cost curve estimated here is nearly a thousand times flatter than the value used by Newell and Pizer (2003) , while the marginal benefit curve is over a thousand times steeper. While these differences are striking, they are readily explained. Newell and Pizer rely on results from the Energy Modeling Forum (Weyant and Hill 1999) for their cost estimates. The underlying simulations focused explicitly on the Kyoto Protocol, hardly a cost-effective policy. More importantly, Weyant and Hill present estimates of marginal cost functions for a single year only. But the long-run marginal cost curve will be much flatter than the cost curve for a single period, just as an aggregate supply curve is much flatter than the supply curve of an individual firm. On the benefit side, Newell and Pizer rely on Nordhaus's smooth damage function, while I explicitly impose a threshold. Moreover, I use a discount rate of 2 percent; while lower than what is commonly chosen, this level can be rigorously justified by appealing to observed returns on risk-free investment (Weitzman 2007) .
This simple thought experiment suggests that under plausible assumptions, a relativeslopes argument favors a quantity instrument rather than a price. My estimates are unabashedly back-of-the-envelope in nature, and like any estimates, the ones presented here are sensitive to assumptions. In particular, as always, the choice of discount rate affects benefits. But the basic conclusions are robust: accounting for banking and borrowing has the effect of flattening out the marginal abatement cost curve, while incorporating a threshold in damages leads to steeper marginal benefits. At the very least, this exercise suggests that the prevailing view favoring an emissions tax may be on much less solid ground than is usually assumed, and that more research is needed before we can conclude that the standard prices-versus-quantities argument favors the use of a price instrument.
Summary and Conclusions
Establishing the right long-run framework for U.S. climate policy is crucially important. Once in place, such a policy will create its own constituencies and its own inertia-not only among regulated entities, but also within government regulatory agencies like the EPA. Creating the right initial policy framework will also help to align the expectations (and investment plans) of regulated firms with long-run policy objectives.
In recent years, a dominant view has emerged among academic economists that a carbon tax, rather than a cap and trade program, is the appropriate policy for addressing global warming. While a tax may appear to offer an elegant solution, theoretical elegance does not ensure success in the real world. This article has argued that a cap and trade approach has a number of important advantages. A system of tradable permits offers a great deal of flexibility in allocating the value of emissions, enhancing its political feasibility. Trading promotes costeffectiveness, broad participation, and equity in the international context, without the highlevel coordination that a tax would require. Finally, contrary to the conventional wisdom, controlling the cumulative quantity of GHG emissions may be superior on efficiency grounds when marginal abatement costs are uncertain.
At the same time, the debate over the relative merits of cap and trade and a carbon tax should not obscure another important point: Market-based environmental policy has taken center stage in the debate on climate policy. We should neither lose sight of the significance of this development nor take it for granted. Economists have a crucial role to play in helping to promote sound policy, in particular by highlighting the advantages of market-based policies over command-and-control regulations; emphasizing the efficiency gains from broad coverage and revenue recycling; and designing measures to manage price volatility while preserving a long-run emissions target.
Appendix
This appendix provides details on the assumptions and calculations used to derive the estimates of the slopes of the marginal cost and benefit functions discussed in the "thought experiment" in the fourth section.
Marginal Costs
The discussion in the text suggests a simple back-of-the-envelope way to estimate the longrun MACC: choose a CGE model, take the allowance price forecasts for a variety of policies, and look at the relationship between those prices and estimated abatement. I use forecasts by the ADAGE climate policy model for eight policy scenarios (USEPA 2007 (USEPA , 2008a Ross 2007) . These policy scenarios span a wide range: cumulative abatement over the period 2010-2050 varies from 65 GT (corresponding to a hypothetical policy-freezing emissions at year 2008 levels) to 149 GT (corresponding to a hypothetical policy that would reduce emissions steadily, reaching 80 percent below 1990 levels by mid-century). By comparison, business-as-usual emissions are projected to be 369 GT over the same period.
Starting from those model results, I estimate the slope of the marginal cost function as follows. First, the model runs considered policies lasting through 2050; I estimate cumulative abatement through 2100 simply by assuming that abatement scales up proportionally by a factor of 4, across all model runs. (To determine the appropriate scaling factor, I start by assuming that the Lieberman-Warner bill, S.2191, would have put the U.S. economy on a path consistent with a global temperature target of 2
• C above preindustrial levels-consistent with results from climate modeling. I then extrapolate from the ADAGE model projections of GDP growth and carbon intensity to estimate business-as-usual emissions through 2100. The resulting cumulative required abatement is roughly four times the abatement from 2010 to 2050.) Next, I estimated the least-squares regression line for the forecasted price in the year 2015 as a function of cumulative abatement for the period 2010-2100; the resulting slope (in 2005 dollars) was 9.2 × 10 7 $/GTCO 2 -e 2 . (The R-squared value for this regression is 0.95.) Discounting that slope at a 2 percent annual rate (see discussion of marginal benefits below) yields a present value of 8.0 × 10 7 $/GTCO 2 -e 2 . While regressing forecasted price on cumulative emissions is admittedly a somewhat rough approach, it is essentially the same method used by other researchers, e.g., Newell and Pizer (2003) . Indeed, it is superior in that I use a single CGE model, ensuring that the underlying assumptions-about technology, interest rates, energy prices, and so on-are held constant across policy scenarios. The choice of model, however, is not crucial to this exercise; other prominent CGE models (e.g., the MIT EPPA model (Paltsev et al. 2007) or the Second Generation Model [Sands 2007] ) imply similar results.
By using a linear regression line, I am of course imposing a quadratic total cost function. However, if I instead fit a quadratic marginal cost function, the implied slope (in the relevant 2-4
• C range) is flatter, in the neighborhood of 3.5 to 5.5 × 10 7 $/GTCO 2 -e 2 .
Marginal Benefits
The starting point for my estimate of the slope of the marginal benefit function is the damage function in the DICE-2007 model of Nordhaus (2008) . Nordhaus sets damages (as a percentage of current gross world product, or GWP) as D = 0.0028( T) 2 , where T is the change in mean global temperature relative to 1900. I tweak this damage function by assuming that damages increase slowly up to 2.5
• C of warming-in particular reaching only 0.6 percent of GWP for that level (versus 1.8 percent in Nordhaus's specification), which equals the noncatastrophic damages in Nordhaus's model (see the Lab Notes for Nordhaus (2008) , downloaded from http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/Accom_Notes_100507.pdf). At 3 • C of warming and above, I assume that catastrophic damages kick in, so that the damage function is equal to Nordhaus's original estimate. I assume for simplicity that the damages resulting in 2100 due to temperature increases in that year, expressed as a percentage of GWP, apply to every subsequent year forever. Effectively, I assume that in the year 2100 a magic atmospheric stabilization technology is developed that prevents any further climate change from occurring. This is obviously a conservative approach, since temperature (and damages) would keep rising even given the accumulated emissions up to 2100, with disproportionately greater effects on the highemissions scenarios. On the other hand, since I am not considering the costs of abatement beyond 2100, it does not seem consistent to consider the benefits beyond that point.
To convert damages from percentage of future GWP into dollar terms, I start with Nordhaus's estimate for GWP of $56 trillion in 2005. I assume economic growth of 1.8 percent per annum from 2010 into the future, midway between Nordhaus's estimate of 1.3 percent and the median projection of 2.3 percent in the survey by the IPCC (2000). As always, the discount rate plays a key role in the analysis. I choose a value of 2 percent (the discount rate must be higher than the growth rate in my simple illustration), meant to reflect the idea that the appropriate social discount rate should be close to the risk-free interest rate, given the assessment that climate damages are not fully correlated with economic output; see the lucid discussion in Weitzman (2007) . (For reference, a discount rate of 2.5 percent would reduce the estimated marginal benefit slope by a factor of 5-putting it at the same order of magnitude as the estimated slope of marginal cost.) Finally, I match these damages to cumulative emissions using four emissions scenarios corresponding to temperature increases (relative to preindustrial levels) of 2, 2.5, 3, and 4
• C.
These scenarios are constructed as "peaking scenarios" using the MAGICC climate model that afford an 83 percent probability of keeping mean global temperatures in the year 2100 below their specified levels (James Wang, personal communication; for technical background and a description of methodology behind a similar analysis, see Wang, O'Neill, and Chameides [2007] ). Treating the dollar-valued damages derived and these cumulative emissions budgets as "data," I find the best-fitting power function and use that for damages; the resulting damage function is D(S) = 3.98e −09 (S) 3.208 , where D is expressed in present-value terms, in trillions of 2005 dollars, and S is the cumulative emissions in gigatons of CO 2 -equivalent. I then compute this slope at the values of cumulative emissions corresponding to temperature targets of 2 and 4
• C, as described in the text.
To check the internal validity of the model, I compute the efficient target implied by my assumptions. Using an estimate of 5,300 GTCO 2 -e for business-as-usual emissions to convert emissions to abatement (very close to the BAU projection in Nordhaus [2008] and broadly consistent with the MAGICC climate model), the efficient cumulative emissions level implied by my figures is 2,000 GT, corresponding to a temperature increase of between 2 and 2.5
• C above preindustrial levels. Hence the marginal benefit curve is indeed steeper than marginal cost in the neighborhood of the efficient target.
